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FROM PROTECTING WATER QUALITY TO
PROTECTING STATES’ RIGHTS: FIFTY
YEARS OF SUPREME COURT CLEAN
WATER ACT STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Stephen M. Johnson*

ABSTRACT
In 1972, a bipartisan Congress enacted the Clean Water Act “to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” Almost fifty years have passed since Congress enacted the
law, and during that time, the Supreme Court has played a significant role
in the administration and evolution of the law. Since the dawn of the environmental era in the 1970s, the Supreme Court has heard more cases involving the Clean Water Act than any other environmental law. However,
the manner in which the Court has analyzed the law has changed substantially over the last half century. A review of the thirty cases that the Court
has heard that involve statutory interpretation of the Clean Water Act show
that during the early years of the Act, the Court focused heavily on legislative history and the purpose of the law in Section 101(a) and interpreted the
law to carry out that purpose. Over time, though, the Court adopted a more
textualist approach to interpreting the Clean Water Act, and beginning with
the Rehnquist Court, the Court began to focus on protecting states’ rights.
In contrast to the Court’s early opinions, opinions from the past few decades generally do not discuss the water quality protection purposes of
§ 101(a) of the Clean Water Act. Instead, to the limited extent that the
Court focuses on the purposes of the law, it cites language in § 101(b) of
the law that discusses a Congressional policy to preserve and protect states’
rights.
A review of the Court’s Clean Water Act cases also shows that as the
Court has moved to a more textualist approach to statutory interpretation,
it has become more ideologically divided, and the outcomes of the cases
could be more frequently characterized as anti-environmental. In addition,
while early Supreme Court Clean Water Act decisions often adopted a rhetorical tone sympathizing with the government’s efforts to advance public
* Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School. B.S., J.D., Villanova University;
LL.M., George Washington University School of Law.
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rights with limited resources, more recent decisions tend to adopt a tone of
skepticism or even hostility toward government regulation.
The shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act is
troubling because it coincides with Congressional disengagement in oversight of the law. In the first few decades after the Clean Water Act was
enacted, Congress was vigilant in responding to Supreme Court and lower
court interpretations of the law, and frequently legislated to affirm or overturn those interpretations. That is no longer the case, for either the Clean
Water Act or most other environmental laws. If the Supreme Court adopts
an interpretation of the law that conflicts with the water quality protection
goals and purposes of the law, Congress is no longer likely to step in to
correct the Court’s mistake.
The lack of concern demonstrated by the Supreme Court and Congress
toward interpreting and applying the Clean Water Act to meet the § 101(a)
goals to protect water quality could be counterbalanced to some degree by
aggressive implementation of the law by EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to carry out those goals. Chevron deference to the agencies’ interpretations of the law could provide a minor bulwark against the erosion
of the law. However, courts are increasingly finding ways to avoid applying
Chevron to agency decisions. Even if courts continued to aggressively apply Chevron to agency actions, though, deferring to the actions that the
EPA and the Corps have taken over the past few years would not advance
the water quality protection goals of the Clean Water Act because the agencies have increasingly emphasized the protection of states’ rights policy of
the law in § 101(b) in their decision-making at the expense of the water
quality protection goals of § 101(a). The agencies’ recent navigable waters
protection rule and EPA’s policy reversal regarding discharges to groundwater in the County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund case are just
a few examples of the agencies’ policy shift.
In anticipation of the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the enactment of
the modern Clean Water Act, this Article examines the evolution of the
Court’s statutory interpretation of the law over the half century since its
enactment. The Article also explores the Congressional and agency responses to the Court’s shifting interpretation. The Article suggests that all
three branches of government have abdicated their responsibility to advance the ambitious water quality protection goals adopted by Congress in
1972, even though public opinion polls still show strong support for government regulation to protect clean water.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

N the middle of the twentieth century, it was said that anyone who
fell into the Cuyahoga River would not drown, but would decay.1
When, in 1969, the river caught fire for the thirteenth time in a century, it sparked a public outcry for more stringent protection of the nation’s waters.2 In response to that call, a bipartisan Congress enacted the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, more commonly referred to today as the Clean Water Act.3 The goal of the law, set
forth in § 101(a) of the statute, was “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”4 Almost
fifty years have passed since Congress enacted the law, and during that
time, the Supreme Court has played a significant role in the administration and evolution of the law.
1. History of the Clean Water Act (CWA), U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://
cfpub.epa.gov/watertrain/moduleFrame.cfm?parent_object_id=2571 [https://perma.cc/
69LN-XSB2]; David A. Keiser & Joseph S. Shapiro, Consequences of the Clean Water Act
and the Demand for Water Quality 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
23070, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23070/w23070.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/WP36-BZHK].
2. See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 1; see also The Cuyahoga’s Comeback,
AM. RIVERS, https://www.americanrivers.org/cuyahoga50/index.html [https://perma.cc/
Q3FJ-HS24].
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
4. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
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Since the dawn of the environmental era in the 1970s, the Supreme
Court has heard more cases involving the Clean Water Act than cases
involving any other environmental law.5 However, the manner in which
the Court has analyzed the law has changed substantially over the last
half century. A review of the thirty cases that the Court has heard that
involve statutory interpretation of the Clean Water Act shows that the
Court, during the early years of the Act, focused heavily on legislative
history and the purpose of the law as stated in § 101(a) and interpreted
the law to carry out that purpose.6 Over time, though, the Court adopted
a more textualist approach to interpreting the Clean Water Act,7 and beginning with the Rehnquist Court, the Court began to focus on protecting
states’ rights.8 In contrast to the Court’s early opinions, opinions from the
past few decades generally do not discuss the water quality protection
purposes of § 101(a) of the Clean Water Act.9 Instead, to the limited extent that the Court focuses on the purposes of the law, it cites language in
§ 101(b)10 that discusses a congressional policy to preserve and protect
states’ rights.11 The trend from a purposivist approach to statutory interpretation to a textualist approach in Clean Water Act cases is similar to a
trend identified by Professor David Driesen and his associates in their
review of fifty years of the Court’s Clean Air Act jurisprudence.12 A review of the Court’s Clean Water Act cases also shows that as the Court
has moved to a more textualist approach to statutory interpretation, it
has become more ideologically divided,13 and the outcomes of the cases
could more frequently be characterized as anti-environmental.14 In addition, while early Supreme Court Clean Water Act decisions often
adopted a rhetorical tone sympathetic to the government’s efforts to advance public rights with limited resources, more recent decisions tend to
adopt a tone of antiregulatory skepticism toward government
regulation.15
The shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act
is troubling because it coincides with congressional disengagement in
5. Between 1972 and 2012, the Supreme Court issued 34 opinions in cases involving
the Clean Water Act, which equated to 34% of the 100 opinions that the Court issued
during that time in cases involving environmental laws. Sandra Zellmer, Treading Water
While Congress Ignores the Nation’s Environment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2323, 2324
(2013). The Clean Air Act was the second most frequent subject of Supreme Court opinions during that period, but the Court issued only twenty-two opinions addressing that law.
Id.
6. See infra Sections V.A, V.B.
7. See infra Section V.A.
8. See infra Section V.D.
9. See infra Section V.B.
10. Clean Water Act § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
11. See infra Section V.B.
12. See David M. Driesen, Thomas M. Keck & Brandon T. Metroka, Half a Century of
Supreme Court Clean Air Act Interpretation: Purposivism, Textualism, Dynamism, and Activism, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1825 (2018).
13. See infra Section V.C.
14. See infra Section V.E.
15. See infra Section V.E.
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oversight of the law. In the first few decades after it enacted the Clean
Water Act, Congress was vigilant in responding to Supreme Court and
lower court interpretations of the law, and Congress frequently legislated
to affirm or overturn those interpretations.16 That is no longer the case
for the Clean Water Act and for most other environmental laws.17 If the
Supreme Court adopts an interpretation of the law that conflicts with the
water quality protection goals and the purposes of the law, Congress is no
longer likely to step in to correct the Court’s mistake.
The lack of concern demonstrated by the Supreme Court and Congress
toward interpreting and applying the Clean Water Act to meet § 101(a)’s
goals of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”18 could be counterbalanced to some
degree by aggressive implementation of the law by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
to carry out those goals. Chevron deference to the agencies’ interpretations of the law could provide a minor bulwark against the erosion of the
law.19 However, courts are increasingly finding ways to avoid applying
Chevron to agency decisions.20 Even if courts continued to aggressively
apply Chevron to agency actions, deferring to the EPA’s and Corps’s recent actions would not advance the water quality protection goals of the
Clean Water Act because the agencies have increasingly emphasized the
protection-of-states’-rights policy of the law in § 101(b) in their decisionmaking at the expense of the water quality protection goals of § 101(a).21
The agencies’ recent navigable waters protection rule22 and the EPA’s
policy reversal regarding discharges to groundwater23 in County of Maui
v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund24 are just a few examples of the agencies’ policy
shift.
The agencies’ shifting interpretation of the Clean Water Act is also evident in an analysis of the actions being reviewed by the Supreme Court
and the agencies’ positions in those cases over time. While many of the
early cases involved challenges to agency actions that imposed costly requirements on regulated entities, most of the challenges to agency action
in the Roberts Court era involve allegations that the agencies were not
regulating aggressively enough.25 Notably, in most of the cases heard by
the Roberts Court, the agencies supported the positions advanced by reg16. See infra Part VII.
17. See infra Part VII.
18. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
19. See infra Part VIII.
20. See infra Part VIII.
21. See infra Part VIII.
22. The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United
States,” 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40
C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401).
23. Interpretive Statement on Application of the Clean Water Act National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Program to Releases of Pollutants from a Point Source to
Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810 (Apr. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
24. See 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020).
25. See infra Part VIII.
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ulated entities.26 At this point, therefore, it appears that all three
branches of government have abdicated their responsibility to advance
the ambitious water quality protection goals that Congress adopted in
1972. All of this is happening at a time when public opinion polls still
show strong support for government regulation to protect clean water.27
This Article focuses primarily on the evolution of the Supreme Court’s
statutory interpretation of the Clean Water Act over the half century
since its enactment, although it also explores the congressional and
agency response to the Court’s shifting interpretation. The Article was
inspired by the work done by Professor Driesen and his associates to explore the Court’s treatment of the Clean Air Act28 and by Professor
Richard Lazarus’s thorough reevaluation of the Court’s decisions interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).29 Part II of the
Article provides background on the Clean Water Act and its structure,
the regulatory regime that preceded the law, the successes of the law, and
the obstacles to further progress under the law. Part III briefly shifts focus to outline the findings of Professor Driesen and Professor Lazarus in
their studies of the Supreme Court’s review of the Clean Air Act and
NEPA, respectively. Part IV outlines the methodology used to identify
and analyze the Supreme Court Clean Water Act decisions that are the
subject of the Article. Part V discusses the similarities between the findings of this study and the findings of Professor Driesen and his associates.
Specifically, it discusses the Court’s shift to textualism and de-emphasis of
the Act’s purposes in § 101(a) and the shift from unanimous decisions to
a fractured and ideologically ordered Court. It also discusses the rise of
federalism and states’ rights in the Court’s opinions during the Rehnquist
era. Part VI of the Article describes the similarities between the findings
of this examination of the Clean Water Act decisions and the more general conclusions that other academics have reached regarding the Supreme Court’s views toward environmental law. Part VII turns from an
examination of the Court’s decisions to an examination of the change in
the congressional response to the Court’s decisions. Part VIII then discusses the shift in federal administration of the Clean Water Act, the
changing nature of the actions being challenged in the Supreme Court
under the law, the change in the government’s success rate over time, and
the impact of Chevron on the Court’s interpretation of the Act. Part IX
provides some concluding thoughts on the changes in the Court, Congress, and agencies.

26. See infra Part VIII.
27. See infra notes 275–79.
28. See Driesen et al., supra note 12.
29. Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme
Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507 (2012).
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II. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Federal water pollution legislation did not begin with the Clean Water
Act, but the nature of water pollution control was significantly different
before the Act. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 194830 was
the first major federal water pollution control law, but it treated water
pollution as a problem to be solved by the states and provided money and
research support to the states to address the problem.31 It did not establish or require any federal goals, limits, or guidelines, but it required
states to create plans to address water pollution.32 Congress imposed additional responsibilities on states in the Water Quality Act of 1965, which
required states to establish ambient water quality standards for all interstate waters.33 Despite those early efforts, there was a widespread belief
that the federal laissez-faire model was not working, as bacteria levels in
the Hudson River were almost two hundred times higher than safe levels
and the Cuyahoga River caught fire for the thirteenth time.34 State and
local governments were not adequately enforcing water pollution limits,
and it was very difficult to identify polluters that were responsible for the
pollution that led to violations of water quality standards.35 In addition,
state programs without federal regulation can never adequately protect
water quality: water pollution crosses state lines, and states cannot regu30. Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388).
31. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30030, CLEAN WATER ACT: A
SUMMARY OF THE LAW 2 (2016). This was the typical federal response to environmental
problems before the advent of the major environmental laws in the 1970s. See Jonathan H.
Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 377, 381 (2005); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1147–60 (1995).
32. See COPELAND, supra note 31, at 2–3; Percival, supra note 31, at 1155.
33. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903.
34. See Drew Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27
ENV’T L. REP. 10574, 10576–78 (1997) (describing the pollution in the Hudson and
Cuyahoga Rivers and noting that the legislative history for the 1972 Clean Water Act characterized the existing water pollution control programs as inadequate in every vital aspect);
Keiser & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1; see also Jon Devine, Clean Water Act at 45: Despite
Success, It’s Under Attack, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/
experts/jon-devine/clean-water-act-45-despite-success-its-under-attack [https://perma.cc/
3MBC-AF6E] (describing 26 million fish killed by pollution in a Florida lake, pollution
discharges in the Detroit River that increased mercury levels to six times the limit set by
the Public Health Service, and projections that Lake Erie would become biologically dead
due to municipal waste discharges and agricultural runoff); Adler, supra note 31, at 382.
Some commentators argue, however, that some water pollution levels were declining faster
before the Clean Water Act was adopted than the rate at which they declined after it was
adopted. See, e.g., Keiser & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 21; Adler, supra note 31, at 465–66.
35. See COPELAND, supra note 31, at 2; Caputo, supra note 34, at 10578–79. Representative Harold Gross discussed concerns regarding the lax nature of state pollution control
prior to the enactment of the Clean Water Act when, during the House debate on the bill
that became the Clean Water Act, he noted that “[t]hrough the years the States and the
local subdivisions of government, including the municipalities, failed to enforce laws and
ordinances in the matter of pollution and especially the polluting of streams.” 118 CONG.
REC. 10,203 (1972) (statement of Rep. Harold Gross), reprinted in COMM. ON PUB.
WORKS, 93D CONG., 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 349 (1973) [hereinafter 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
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late outside of their jurisdiction to prevent pollution that originates upstream.36 As a result, Congress adopted a new model in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.37 The Clean Water
Act replaced the failed model of enforcement of ambient water quality
standards through a patchwork of state laws with a comprehensive federal regulatory program.38
The Clean Water Act was enacted with widespread public support39
and overwhelming bipartisan congressional support.40 The primary purpose of the law, outlined in § 101(a), is “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”41 The
law set an ambitious goal of eliminating all discharges of pollution into
navigable waters by 198542 and an interim goal of making all waters safe
for fishing and swimming by 1983.43 Congress adopted a “technologyforcing” approach44 in the statute and required the EPA to establish technology-based standards to limit the amount of pollution that could be
discharged into the nation’s waters.45 The law requires all persons who
discharge pollution into regulated waters to obtain a permit that limits
the pollution levels to those established by the EPA’s technology-based
standards.46 The law also allows the permit issuer to establish more stringent limits on the discharger beyond the technology-based limits if it is
necessary to ensure that the water into which the pollution is discharged
does not violate state water quality standards.47 While permits are issued
to most industrial dischargers under § 402 of the law, permits for discharges of dredged or fill material are issued by the Corps under § 404 of
the law.48
Although the technology-based approach is more stringent than the approach taken by states prior to the enactment of the law, and the cost of
compliance with the law was the predominant factor that led President
Nixon to veto the law initially,49 the Clean Water Act frequently autho36. The Supreme Court recognized the important role that the federal government
plays in regulating water bodies that affect multiple States when it wrote, in International
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, “While source States have a strong voice in regulating their own
pollution, the CWA contemplates a much lesser role for States that share an interstate
waterway with the source (the affected States).” 479 U.S. 481, 490 (1987).
37. See COPELAND, supra note 31, at 2.
38. See id.; Adler, supra note 31, at 382–83.
39. See Caputo, supra note 34, at 10575.
40. See id. at 10574. The bill passed unanimously in the Senate and passed in the
House with only eleven dissenters. Id. (citing 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 35,
at 222–23). Although President Nixon vetoed the bill, the House and Senate quickly overturned the President’s veto by comfortable margins. See id. (citing 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 35, at 109–13, 135–36).
41. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
42. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
43. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
44. COPELAND, supra note 31, at 2; see Caputo, supra note 34, at 10578–79.
45. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b).
46. See id. § 1311(a).
47. See id. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
48. See id. § 1344(a), (d).
49. See Caputo, supra note 34, at 10575.

2021]

Protecting Water Quality to Protecting States’ Rights

367

rizes the EPA to consider cost in setting the technology-based limits or
issuing permits.50 Many of the Supreme Court’s Clean Water Act opinions have struggled with the role that cost plays in various provisions of
the law.51
Like most federal environmental laws, the Clean Water Act adopts a
cooperative federalism model.52 Section 101(b) of the law outlines congressional policy “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,
[and] to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources.”53
If states adopt laws and regulations that meet federal standards, states
can take over primary administration and enforcement of the Clean
Water Act permitting programs, though the federal government retains
authority to review the permits issued by states and bring enforcement
actions in those states.54 Even if states do not take over the federal permitting programs, § 401 of the law authorizes states to impose conditions
on federal permits to ensure that discharges meet water quality standards
and other state requirements.55 In addition to playing a role in permitting, states also receive funding under the Clean Water Act to facilitate a
wide variety of water pollution planning and control programs.56 Finally,
§ 510 of the Clean Water Act provides that states can adopt their own
water quality protection laws and rules that are as stringent or more stringent than the federal law.57 This floor preemption model is typical of
most federal environmental laws.58
Congress made modifications to the Clean Water Act in 197759 and
198760 to address toxic water pollutants and non-point source pollution61
50. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (variances from best available technology requirements available based on economic hardship); id. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (authorizing EPA to
consider cost in setting effluent limits based on best practicable technology); id.
§ 1314(b)(4)(B) (authorizing EPA to consider cost in setting effluent limits based on best
conventional technology).
51. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 223 (2009); EPA v. Nat’l
Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 85 (1980) (EPA not required to provide variances from
best practicable technology effluent limits based on economic inability to comply).
52. See COPELAND, supra note 31, at 4, 7; Adler, supra note 31, at 384–85.
53. Clean Water Act § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
54. See id. §§ 1342(b), 1344(g)(1); see also COPELAND, supra note 31, at 7. Forty-six
states have been delegated authority to administer the Clean Water Act § 402 permit program. COPELAND, supra note 31, at 4. Only two states have assumed authority to issue
§ 404 dredge and fill permits. Id. at 6.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2).
56. See, e.g., id. § 1255(a)(1) (grants to states, municipalities or interstate agencies for
water pollution demonstration projects); id. § 1255(b) (grants to states or interstate agencies for water pollution demonstration projects in river basins); id. § 1258(a) (grants to
states for water pollution programs in the Great Lakes).
57. Id. § 1370.
58. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6929; Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
59. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
60. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
61. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317, 1329.
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but did not make any other significant changes to the law in the subsequent thirty-three years.62 Although the law has not yet achieved its ambitious goals in the near fifty years since its enactment, most
commentators agree that it has prompted significant reductions in pollution from point sources and reduced the levels of many types of pollutants in the nation’s waters.63 The point source program has prevented
more than 700 billion pounds of toxic pollutant discharges;64 slowed the
pace of wetland destruction in many areas;65 greatly reduced the levels of
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD),66 fecal coliform,67 total suspended
solids,68 and lead and mercury in the nation’s waters;69 and increased the
percentage of waters that are fishable and swimmable by 12%.70
Although the Act has prompted significant reduction in pollution from
point sources, the law has done little to slow pollution from non-point
sources or to improve compliance with water quality standards.71 Both of
those areas have been left largely to state regulation under the Clean
Water Act. Recent studies show more than half of all waters do not meet
water quality standards, including more than two-thirds of the nation’s
lakes and reservoirs.72 More than 35% of the nation’s lakes and streams
have excess nutrient levels,73 and 46% of the nation’s rivers and streams
were in poor condition.74 Most state water quality standards fail to include provisions to protect the biological or physical integrity of the
state’s waters.75 The country is still not close to meeting the 1983 interim
62. See COPELAND, supra note 31, at 1. Although authorizations for appropriations for
the law ended in 1990, Congress has continued to appropriate funds to administer the law
for the following three decades. Id.
63. See Caputo, supra note 34, at 10576.
64. See Devine, supra note 34.
65. See id.
66. See Keiser & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 21 (finding a decline of 1%–2% per year in
BOD levels between 1972 and 2001); see also ANDREW STODDARD, JON B. HARCUM,
JONATHAN T. SIMPSON, JAMES R. PAGENKOPF & ROBERT K. BASTIAN, MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT: EVALUATING IMPROVEMENTS IN NATIONAL WATER QUALITY 61
(2002) (noting that an EPA study found a 23% decline in the amount of BOD discharges
from industrial point sources between 1968 and 1996).
67. See Keiser & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 21 (finding a decline of 2.5% per year in
fecal coliform levels between 1972 and 2001).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 22.
70. See id. at 21. However, for most pollutants, Keiser & Shapiro did not find significant reductions after 1990. Id. at 20–21.
71. See Caputo, supra note 34, at 10575, 10577–78; see also THE JOHNSON FOUND. AT
WINGSPREAD, CONFERENCE REPORT: CONSIDERING THE CLEAN WATER ACT 10 (2009),
https://www.johnsonfdn.org/sites/default/files/Clean_Water_Act_3.02.10.web_.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7CX2-H7JF]. Non-point source pollution is a primary reason why many waters
do not meet state water-quality standards. See Caputo, supra note 34, at 10577–78.
72. See THE JOHNSON FOUND. AT WINGSPREAD, supra note 71, at 8 (noting that 66%
of lakes and 64% of bays and estuaries do not meet water quality standards); Devine,
supra note 34 (finding that 52.7% of rivers and streams and 70.5% of lakes, reservoirs, and
ponds do not meet water quality standards).
73. See Devine, supra note 34 (excess nutrient levels in 40% of rivers and streams).
74. See id.
75. See THE JOHNSON FOUND. AT WINGSPREAD, supra note 71, at 12.
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goal that all waters should be fishable and swimmable,76 and the rate of
wetland loss in the United States increased between 2004 and 2009.77 In
response to these failures, some critics argue that stronger federal authority is needed to address the remaining problems.78 Supreme Court decisions narrowing federal jurisdiction over waters under the Clean Water
Act have contributed to the nation’s water quality problems as well.79
III. THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND NEPA IN THE SUPREME
COURT
While the Clean Water Act has been the most heavily litigated environmental statute before the Supreme Court, the Court has also heard dozens of cases involving the Clean Air Act and NEPA, and academic
analyses of the Court’s treatment of those statutes inspired the study that
forms the basis for this Article.
A. FIFTY YEARS

SUPREME COURT CLEAN AIR ACT
JURISPRUDENCE

OF

In a 2018 law review article, Professors David Driesen, Thomas Keck,
and Brandon Metroka examined the twenty opinions that the Supreme
Court had issued that involved the Clean Air Act over fifty years.80 They
were interested in exploring whether and how the Court’s approach to
statutory interpretation had changed over the years,81 whether the Court
adapted its approach to interpret the Clean Air Act dynamically,82 and
whether the various methods of statutory interpretation facilitated or impeded ideological decision-making by the Justices.83 They were also interested in exploring whether and how the Court adapted its decisionmaking to changes in political views or elite opinion.84
At the outset of the article, they noted that many scholars have argued
that the predominant method of statutory interpretation on the Supreme
Court has shifted from purposivism, which was popular through the late
76. See id. at 8.
77. See Devine, supra note 34 (citing T.E. DAHL, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 2004 TO 2009 16
(2011)).
78. See Caputo, supra note 34, at 10581; THE JOHNSON FOUND. AT WINGSPREAD,
supra note 71, at 14 (discussing the need for a strong federal role, as well as a better framework with defined roles for federal, state and local regulators and improved coordination
among those entities); WILLIAM L. ANDREEN & SHANA CAMPBELL JONES, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE CLEAN WATER ACT: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 30 (2008), http:/
/www.progressivereform.net/articles/CW_Blueprint_802.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP2VXB5V].
79. See THE JOHNSON FOUND. AT WINGSPREAD, supra note 71, at 5, 12.
80. See Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1785–86.
81. Id. at 1785.
82. Id. at 1784–87.
83. Id. at 1784–85.
84. Id. at 1786–88.
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twentieth century, to textualism.85 In traditional purposivism, judges will
interpret a statute to achieve the purposes for which Congress enacted
the statute, even though that interpretation might not coincide with the
most natural reading of the plain meaning of the text used in the statute.86 Although purposivism in its most extreme form would counsel interpretation of a statute against its plain meaning, most judges that
adopted a purposivist approach to statutory interpretation relied on the
purpose to interpret a statute only when the language used by Congress
was ambiguous.87 Textualism, on the other hand, is a method of statutory
interpretation that focuses primarily on the plain meaning of the text in a
statute.88 In its most extreme form, textualism eschews examination of
legislative history or any other extrinsic sources of interpretation.89 In its
more moderate form, textualist judges will examine the structure of the
statute and similar statutes, the context of language, and similar extrinsic
sources to determine the meaning of otherwise ambiguous language.90
Some commentators have suggested that the Roberts Court may be
slowly moving back toward purposivism.91 In light of the prevailing views
regarding the shifting nature of statutory interpretation on the Supreme
Court, Professor Driesen and his coauthors wanted to explore whether
the Court had adopted a shift from purposivism to textualism in its Clean
Air Act jurisprudence as well.92
85. Id. at 1785, 1787 (citing John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001)); see also David M. Driesen, Purposeless Construction, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 115–17 (2013); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15 (2006); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 183 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of
the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 366 (1994); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 34 (1994).
86. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892);
Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1799–1800 (citing 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58:6 (7th ed. 2008));
Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters: Statutory Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV.
955, 961 (2005); Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court’s 2003–04 Term, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 565, 574 (2005); Note, The Rise of Purposivism
and Fall of Chevron: Major Statutory Cases in the Supreme Court, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1227,
1229 (2017).
87. See Lin, supra note 86, at 574; Craig, supra note 86, at 973–74. The extreme form of
purposivism is rarely employed, and Holy Trinity has not been cited by the Supreme Court
in decades. See Note, supra note 86, at 1228; John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1312–13 (2010). The more recent version of purposivism is
based on Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks’s legal process theory. See Note, supra
note 86, at 1228.
88. See Craig, supra note 86, at 972; Note, supra note 86, at 1228; Molot, supra note 85,
at 2–3; Lin, supra note 86, at 572–73.
89. See Lin, supra note 86, at 575–76; Craig, supra note 86, at 962; Note, supra note 86,
at 1228.
90. See Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1801; Manning, supra note 85, at 17; Note,
supra note 86, at 1228; Merrill, supra note 85, at 352.
91. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1278–79
(2020); Note, supra note 86, at 1228.
92. See Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1785–87.
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Driesen and his associates were particularly interested in exploring
whether there had been a shift in the Court’s method of statutory interpretation because the issue was closely related to their examination of the
role of ideology and activism in the Court’s resolution of the Clean Air
Act cases. Some have criticized purposivism on the ground that it gives
judges too much power to identify the purpose of a statute in a way that
aligns with their ideological view of the appropriate interpretation of the
statute.93 Textualists, including Justice Scalia, argue that textualism constrains the ability of judges to adopt interpretations of statutes based on
their ideological views since they are limited to reading the statute according to the plain meaning of the text.94 Critics of textualism counter
that judges can use the canons of statutory interpretation equally adeptly
in textualism to interpret statutes in a manner that aligns with their
ideology.95
In addition to exploring whether Justices used statutory interpretation
methods to adopt ideological interpretations of the Clean Air Act, Professor Driesen and his coauthors were interested in examining whether
the Court interpreted the law dynamically to adapt to changing views.
They noted that the Clean Air Act “reflects a rights-based view of environmental law that enjoyed broad bipartisan and public support for at
least twenty years. . . . [But] this view has become less popular among
both elites and politicians.”96 The goal of the Clean Air Act is “to protect
public health and the environment, rather than to achieve a balance between environmental protection and competing considerations,” such as
cost.97 Over time, though, political and elite opinions shifted to embrace
cost-benefit analysis in environmental policymaking.98 Accordingly,
93. See id. at 1800–01; W. Matt Morgan, What Did They Mean?: How Principles of
Group Communication Can Inform Original Meaning Jurisprudence and Address the Problem of Collective Intent, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1215, 1224 (2015); Victoria Nourse,
Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and
the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1176 (2011); Craig, supra note 86, at 962; Lin,
supra note 86, at 574–76 (discussing the criticism of the use of legislative history to identify
statutory purpose); Courtney Simmons, Unmasking the Rhetoric of Purpose: The Supreme
Court and Legislative Compromise, 44 EMORY L.J. 117, 131 (1995); Philip P. Frickey, From
the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 241, 250–51 (1992). However, others argue that the failure to consider a statute’s
purpose when interpreting it can lead to judicial activism. See, e.g., Matthew B. Todd,
Avoiding Judicial In-Activism: The Use of Legislative History to Determine Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 189, 189 (2006).
94. See Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1800–01; Lin, supra note 86, at 575–76, 580;
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23
(1997).
95. See Craig, supra note 86, at 972; Lin, supra note 86, at 580–81, 601–02; Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 649 (1992); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA.
L. REV. 1295, 1331 (1990).
96. Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1799.
97. Id. at 1788.
98. See id. at 1792–95. The law and economics movement strongly influenced environmental policy-makers in the 1980s and later. Id. at 1792–93. Political opinion eventually
shifted toward cost–benefit analysis as well. Id. at 1794–95.
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Driesen and his colleagues were interested in exploring whether the
Court interpreted the law dynamically to adapt to those changing political and elite views regarding cost-benefit analysis99 and climate
change.100
Based on their review of the twenty Supreme Court Clean Air Act
cases, Professor Driesen and his colleagues noted an evolution in the
Court’s interpretation of the law along many dimensions progressing
from the Burger Court to the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. In the
1970s, during the era of the Burger Court, Driesen and his colleagues
found that the Court
tended to follow statutory purpose and text and usually issued unanimous or nearly unanimous opinions . . . . The Court also freely relied
upon structure and legislative history. . . . And the Court only acted
contrary to statutory purpose where specific text or a constitutional
value pushed in that direction. . . .
. . Purposivism seems to have led the Court to decisions that often
followed the [Clean Air Act]’s philosophy.101
They noted that the Court focused on the technology-forcing nature of
the statute and its goals as well as congressional silence regarding the
consideration of costs.102 They also noted that “in most of the cases considered during that period, the Court granted certiorari in order to resolve conflicts among the circuits.”103
In the 1980s as the Burger Court gave way to the Rehnquist Court,
Driesen and his colleagues found that the Court moved away from
purposivism as a method of statutory interpretation.104 However, instead
of moving toward textualism, they found that the Court’s Clean Air Act
decisions in the 1980s “evince[d] a judicial pursuit of policy goals that are
unmoored from statutory text and purpose. Indeed, almost all of them
form[ed] . . . a judicially crafted common law on attorneys’ fees.”105 Many
of the decisions stood in tension with the policies of the statute.106
Driesen and his colleagues also found that the Court’s decisions were no
longer unanimous or nearly unanimous.107 Instead, they found that the
Court’s decisions often tracked ideological lines.108
Driesen and his colleagues used Martin–Quinn scores, a measure of
judicial ideology widely used by political scientists, to categorize the opin99. Id. at 1799.
100. Id. at 1797–98. While political and elite opinion support cost–benefit analysis,
Driesen notes that “political opinion has recently departed markedly from educated elite
opinion, which tends to favor some action on global climate disruption.” Id. at 1798.
101. Id. at 1807, 1810 (footnotes omitted)
102. See id. at 1803–04.
103. Id. at 1802.
104. See id. at 1810.
105. Id. (footnote omitted).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 1816.
108. Id.
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ions in their study as ideologically ordered or ideologically disordered.109
Martin–Quinn scores define a spectrum from conservative to liberal and
locate Justices along the spectrum based on their voting history. Ordered
opinions indicate that the Justices voted in a case as would be predicted
by the ordering of their Martin–Quinn scores.110 Disordered opinions indicate that at least one Justice voted in a way that would not be predicted
by the ordering of their Martin–Quinn scores.111 Thus, an opinion will be
disordered when, if the Justices are placed in a straight line from left to
right, “at least one Justice jumped over one or more neighboring colleagues to join with colleagues further away in ideological space.”112
When Driesen and his colleagues examined the remaining Rehnquist
Court decisions for the period from 1990 to 2004, they found that the
Court, as predicted, shifted firmly to textualism.113 Despite the textualist
supporters’ claims that textualism prevents activist judging, Driesen and
his colleagues found that the decisions during this era continued the ideological divide that began in the 1980s.114
Finally, as Driesen and his colleagues reviewed the Roberts Court
opinions for the period from 2005 to 2016, they concluded that the Court
adopted a dynamic method of interpreting the Clean Air Act that was not
always based on the text of the statute or its purpose but was usually
based on ideology instead.115 In adapting the Clean Air Act to the problem of climate change, they found that the conservative textualist Justices
abandoned text and that the Court’s rulings “divided mostly along ideological lines, except where a clear (albeit countertextual) precedent based
on previous quasi-constitutional judicial policymaking brought them together.”116 In adapting the Clean Air Act to elite and political views
favoring cost-benefit analysis, they found that the Court again interpreted
109. See id. at 1819. See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal
Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10
POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002) (describing the methodology for calculating and using Martin–Quinn scores). The scores are commonly used as a means for measuring voting disorder. See Paul H. Edelman, David E. Klein & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Measuring Deviations
from Expected Voting Patterns on Collegial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 819, 829
(2008). However, the methodology has not escaped some criticism. See Carolyn Shapiro,
The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV.
79, 120–23 (2010).
110. Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1819.
111. Id.
112. Id. For the 2018 Supreme Court term, Justice Thomas had the most conservative
Martin–Quinn score, 3.085, while Justice Alito had the next most conservative score, 1.739.
See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Martin-Quinn Scores: Measures, U. MICH.,
D141, D487 https://mqscores.lsa.umich.edu/measures.php [https://perma.cc/59TV-5JXR]
(select “2018 MQ Scores Data” from “Legacy Data Files” list). Thus, if eight Justices
joined an opinion and Justice Alito was the sole dissenter, the opinion would be ideologically disordered because Justice Thomas, the most conservative Justice, joined with other
more liberal Justices, while Justice Alito, in essence, jumped over Justice Thomas to dissent
alone.
113. See Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1819, 1824–25.
114. See id. at 1823.
115. See id. at 1842–43.
116. Id. at 1835.
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the law dynamically to incorporate those principles—regardless of
whether the interpretation was supported by the text or purpose of the
statute—and that the Justices generally divided in the cases along ideological lines.117
B. A REVIEW

OF THE

SUPREME COURT’S NEPA JURISPRUDENCE

While Professors Driesen, Keck, and Metroka examined the Supreme
Court’s statutory interpretation methodology when they reviewed the
Court’s Clean Air Act jurisprudence, Professor Richard Lazarus took a
different approach when he reviewed the Court’s treatment of NEPA
over the first forty years of the law’s existence.118 Instead, he focused his
analysis on the litigation strategies employed in the cases heard by the
Court and the nuances of the opinions issued by the Court.119
At the time Lazarus conducted his review, academics had traditionally
noted that the federal government had won each of the seventeen NEPA
cases decided on the merits by the Court and that the Court had never
granted a petition for review that was submitted by an environmental
group.120 Those trends led many academics to suggest that the Court was
anti-environmental, or at least anti-NEPA.121
Lazarus’s deeper review of the cases, however, uncovered a different
reality. His analysis unearthed a Court that was neither anti-environment
nor anti-NEPA. When he examined the environmental petitions that
were denied by the Court, he concluded that the nature of the petitions
made it unlikely that the Court would grant them in most cases for three
reasons. First, NEPA cases generally apply in the context of case-by-case
adjudication and usually do not raise broader national issues.122 Second,
NEPA petitions from environmental groups generally appear insignificant to the Court because the environmentalists lost their challenge below; thus, the lower courts in those cases have not awarded extraordinary
relief to stop activity of allegedly national importance.123 Finally, when
the petitions reach the Court, the federal agency’s action has normally
progressed to a stage where the NEPA procedures that were not followed
likely would not affect the agency’s action, even if the Court intervened
and required the agency to follow the procedures.124 Professor Lazarus
also noted that the Court had not granted any petitions for review of
NEPA cases submitted by business interests, except when the Solicitor
General was also petitioning for review in the case on behalf of a federal
117. See id. at 1835–42.
118. Lazarus, supra note 29.
119. See id. at 1511.
120. See id. at 1510. At the time of the study, the Court had rejected 111 petitions from
environmental challengers. See id. In most of the NEPA cases decided on the merits, the
Court reached a unanimous decision in favor of the federal government. See id. at 1521.
121. See id. at 1511, 1523–24.
122. See id. at 1532.
123. See id. at 1533.
124. See id. at 1533–34.
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agency.125
When Professor Lazarus reviewed the decisions that the Court issued
on the merits, he found that, in order to prevail, the Solicitor General
abandoned arguments made in the lower courts in many cases; the government made important concessions on the requirements of NEPA in
many cases; the Court’s opinions were frequently narrow and tied to the
facts of the case before it; and many of the opinions contained significant
dicta favorable to environmentalists.126 Based on his analysis, Lazarus
concluded that “[t]here were many important environmental victories
within [the NEPA] losses, which have since played a role in NEPA continuing to serve as one of the nation’s most important environmental
statutes.”127
Focusing on individual Justices, Lazarus noted that while environmentalism was perhaps Justice Douglas’s greatest passion, he was not an
effective advocate on the Court for environmental issues.128 Justice Marshall, on the other hand, was fairly influential in environmental cases and
wrote opinions for the Court in a significant number of environmental
cases, even though he was not generally viewed as particularly interested
in environmental issues.129
IV. METHODOLOGY FOR THIS ARTICLE
While this Article was inspired by analyses of the Supreme Court’s
Clean Air Act and NEPA decisions, the methodology utilized for this Article aligns more closely with that of Professor Driesen and his colleagues
than that of Professor Lazarus. As the data set for this study, I chose to
focus on all of the Supreme Court decisions that involved statutory interpretation of the Clean Water Act since the law’s enactment in 1972.130
During that period, the Court issued opinions in thirty cases, with its most
recent opinion being issued in the 2019 term.131 The Burger Court, which
spanned the first fourteen years of the study period, issued thirteen of the
opinions.132 The Rehnquist Court issued the fewest number of Clean
125. See id. at 1526.
126. See id. at 1512–13, 1534–36.
127. Id. at 1585.
128. See id. at 1571–72. Lazarus noted that Justice Douglas was a loner on the Court
rather than a consensus-builder and that his personality repelled other Justices. See id. at
1572. Lazarus wrote “his single-minded desire to further a particular public policy was
wholly transparent and likely undermined any possible credibility he might otherwise have
had on such matters based on his clear expertise.” Id.
129. See id. at 1573.
130. The data set excluded Supreme Court Clean Water Act cases where the Court did
not address statutory interpretation questions. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 173–74 (2000) (addressing standing and
mootness); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987) (addressing right to a jury trial).
131. Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
132. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Chem. Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305 (1982); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); EPA v. Nat’l Crushed
Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); Costle v. Pac. Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198 (1980); Crown
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Water Act opinions, handing down seven over the nineteen years of the
Court.133 Finally, the remaining ten opinions were issued during the fifteen years of the study period that coincide with the Roberts Court
era.134
I was interested in comparing the Court’s statutory interpretation
methods in Clean Water Act cases to its statutory interpretation methods
in Clean Air Act cases and in other cases more generally along many
dimensions. Accordingly, each case was coded for twenty-seven different
variables, including the statutory provision at issue; whether the challenged action involved a regulation or a decision made through adjudication; the identity of the petitioner; the identity of the original challenger
and nature of the challenge; whether there was a circuit split below; the
circuit from which the case arose; whether the lower court decision was
affirmed or reversed; the voting alignment in the cases, including the author(s) of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions; whether the
Court primarily considered legislative history, purpose, or text in its analysis; whether the Court used Chevron analysis to resolve the statutory
interpretation question, and if so, whether the Court resolved the issue at
Step One or Step Two; whether the Court adopted the position supported
by the government; whether the decision was ideologically ordered; and
whether the decision could be characterized as one supporting an environmental position.135
V. THE DECLINE OF PURPOSIVISM AND § 101(A)
A review of the Supreme Court’s Clean Water Act opinions from 1972
through April of 2020 revealed a pronounced shift in the Court’s statutory interpretation from the Burger Court through the Rehnquist and
Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980) (per curiam); E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd.,
426 U.S. 200 (1976); Train v. Colo. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976); Train v.
Campaign Clean Water, Inc., 420 U.S. 136 (1975) (per curiam); Train v. City of New York,
420 U.S. 35 (1975).
133. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004); Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); PUD
No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994); U.S. Dep’t of
Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); Int’l Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
134. Cnty. of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462; Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617
(2018); Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597 (2013); L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 568 U.S. 78 (2013); Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (2012);
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009); Entergy Corp.
v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion);
S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006).
135. See Stephen M. Johnson, Clean Water Act Statutory Interpretation Cases in the Supreme Court—1972 to 2020, ENV’T L. TCHR. CLEARINGHOUSE, [hereinafter CWA Spreadsheet], https://www.envirolawteachers.com/cwaspreadsheet.html [https://perma.cc/DE25WACY] (follow “Download the Excel Spreadsheet here” hyperlink).
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Roberts Courts.136 While the Court focused heavily on legislative history
and the Clean Water Act’s water quality protection purpose during the
Burger Court, the Roberts Court rarely examined those sources when
interpreting the law.137 To the extent that the Court has discussed the
purpose of the law over time, it is also significant to note that while the
Burger Court frequently focused on the water quality protection goals of
§ 101(a), the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have increasingly cited the
protection-of-states’-rights policy of § 101(b) in lieu of, or in addition to,
the water quality purposes of § 101(a).138 As Professor Driesen found in
the Clean Air Act context, in Clean Water Act cases, the Court has also
moved from an era of unanimity to an era where the opinions are fractured and usually divided along clear ideological lines.139 While Driesen
found the Court engaging in dynamic statutory interpretation throughout
the Roberts era when interpreting the Clean Air Act, the Court did not
seem to adopt a similar approach when reviewing the Clean Water Act.
There was, however, a clear shift in the Court’s resolution of Clean Water
Act cases during the Rehnquist era, when the Court began to focus much
more directly on limiting federal power and protecting states’ rights.140
That trend continued through the Roberts Court. Finally, fewer and
fewer of the Court’s decisions over time can be considered to be “environmental” in the sense of protecting the environment.141
A. CONSIDERATION

OF

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

OR

PURPOSE

Perhaps the most dramatic shift in the Court’s statutory interpretation
of the Clean Water Act over time is the shift away from consideration of
the statute’s purpose and legislative history and the embrace of textualism. The shift is most apparent with respect to consideration of legislative
history. Although the Burger Court based many decisions primarily on
the text of the Clean Water Act, the Court routinely cited the legislative
history of the statute to support its interpretation of the law.142 The Burger Court cited legislative history in ten of the thirteen opinions that it
handed down.143 In fact, in Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research
136. The Chief Justices have been major players in the Court’s statutory interpretation
of the Clean Water Act since its enactment. Chief Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts
have joined or written the majority opinions in every single Clean Water Act case that was
decided while they served as Chief Justice. Id. Although there was no majority opinion in
the Rapanos case, Justice Roberts joined the plurality opinion in that case. Id.
137. See infra Sections V.A, V.B.
138. See infra Section V.B.
139. See infra Section V.C.
140. See infra Section V.D.
141. See infra Section V.E.
142. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
143. Id. One of the three cases where the Court did not cite legislative history was a per
curiam opinion in Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc., 420 U.S. 136 (1975). Although the
Court did not cite any legislative history in that opinion, it was a companion case to Train
v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 36 (1975), a case in which the Court did cite legislative
history, and the Campaign Clean Water Court held simply that the case was controlled by
Train v. City of New York. See Campaign Clean Water, 420 U.S. at 138.
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Group, Inc., the Court relied almost exclusively on the law’s legislative
history to overturn the Tenth Circuit’s decision, which had concluded—
based on a plain meaning analysis—that the term pollutant included radioactive materials, including those regulated under the Atomic Energy
Act.144 The Rehnquist Court continued the Burger Court’s practice and
cited the Clean Water Act’s legislative history to support its statutory interpretation in five of the seven cases that it decided.145 By contrast, the
Roberts Court almost never discusses legislative history in its Clean
Water Act opinions. Until the Court’s 2020 decision in County of Maui v.
Hawaii Wildlife Fund,146 the Roberts Court had cited legislative history
in only one of the nine Clean Water Act cases.147 With the citation in
County of Maui, the Roberts Court has now cited legislative history in
20% of its opinions—a far cry from the practice of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, where legislative history was generally cited in more than
70% of the Clean Water Act cases.148
Similarly, the Court has significantly reduced its consideration and discussion of the Clean Water Act’s purposes when interpreting the statute
over time. While the Burger Court relied heavily on the plain meaning of
the terms in the Clean Water Act when interpreting the law, it also bolstered its statutory interpretation with citations of the law’s purpose in
nine of the thirteen opinions that it handed down.149 The focus on the
law’s purposes began to decline during the era of the Rehnquist Court,
when the Court focused on the purposes of the law in only four of the
seven cases that it decided.150 The decline has accelerated in the Roberts
Court, which has discussed the purposes of the law to interpret the statute
in only three of the ten cases it has decided.151 If there is—as some academics have suggested—a shift back to purposivism in the Roberts Court,
it is not yet apparent in the Court’s Clean Water Act decisions.152
144. Train v. Colo. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9–11, 23–25 (1976).
145. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
146. Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
147. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
148. Id.
149. See id. Although the Burger Court didn’t discuss the purpose of the Clean Water
Act in Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc., 420 U.S. 136 (1975), the Court’s per curiam
opinion in that case held that the case was controlled by Train v. City of New York, 420
U.S. 35 (1975), a case which did discuss the purposes of the Clean Water Act. See supra
note 143.
150. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. The Court also mentioned § 101(a) in South
Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 102 (2004),
but the reference was included simply as boilerplate to describe the structure of the statute.
The Court did not focus on the purpose of the statute in resolving the issue in the case.
151. The Court also mentioned § 101(a) in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense
Center, 568 U.S. 597, 602 (2013), and National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. Department of
Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 624 (2018), but the reference in each case was included simply as
boilerplate to describe the structure of the statute. The Court did not focus on the purpose
of the statute in resolving the issue in either case.
152. However, the Court’s most recent decision in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife
Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468, 1473–76 (2020), has a strong purposivist tone that does not
appear in any of the other Roberts Court Clean Water Act decisions, except perhaps in
S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection, 547 U.S. 370, 383–84 (2006).
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While the Court’s reduced focus on the purposes of the Clean Water
Act in interpreting the statute is unfortunate, what is more troubling to
supporters of the law’s water quality purposes is that, in recent opinions,
when the Court discusses the purposes of the law, it is much more likely
to discuss § 101(b)’s policy to protect states’ rights than it is to discuss the
law’s broad water quality protection purposes in § 101(a). Although the
Court has cited § 101(a) in almost twice as many cases as it has § 101(b)
over the past half century,153 the Court has cited § 101(b) almost as frequently as it has cited § 101(a) since Justice Rehnquist assumed the mantle as Chief Justice in 1986.154 Citations to § 101(b) were rare in the
Burger Court. Other than a footnote in Train v. Colorado Public Interest
Research Group, Inc.,155 in every case in which the Burger Court discussed the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the Court focused on the
water quality protection goals of § 101(a).156
The Burger Court played an important role in the early development of
the law, adopting interpretations of the law that advanced its technologyforcing, water quality protecting purposes. In E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Train, the Court relied heavily on the purpose of the law to find
that because Congress intended uniformity in the EPA’s technologybased effluent limits, they should be adopted through rulemaking, as opposed to adjudication.157 In EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, the
Court rejected an argument that the agency should provide variances
from technology-based effluent limits because the Court concluded that a
variance would undercut the purpose of the law and the effluent limits.158
The Court acknowledged that the decision would be costly for regulated
entities, but wrote,
Because the 1977 limitations were intended to reduce the total pollution produced by an industry, requiring compliance with [best practi153. The Court has cited § 101(a) in thirteen cases. See City of New York, 420 U.S. at
45; EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 204 (1976); Costle
v. Pac. Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 202 (1980); EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S.
64, 69 (1980); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985);
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101, 105–06 (1992); PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 (1994); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. at 102; S.D. Warren
Co., 547 U.S. at 385; Decker, 568 U.S. at 602; Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 759
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 138 S. Ct. at 624; Cnty. of Maui, 140
S. Ct. at 1468.
The Court has cited § 101(b) in seven cases. See State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at
206–08: Train v. Colo. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9–11, 23–25 (1976); Int’l Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489 (1987); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 166–67, 173 (2001); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 722–23; S.D.
Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 386; Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S.
644, 650 (2007); Cnty. of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1471.
154. The Court has cited § 101(b) in six cases since 1986 and has cited § 101(a) in eight
cases. See cases cited supra note 153 that postdate 1986.
155. Colo. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. at 16 n.13.
156. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
157. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 130–32 (1977).
158. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. at 69, 75–77.
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cable technology] standards necessarily imposed additional costs on
the segment of the industry with the least effective technology. If the
statutory goal is to be achieved, these costs must be borne or the
point source eliminated.159
The Burger Court also relied heavily on the § 101(a) purposes of the
Clean Water Act when it held in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc. that the federal government could regulate wetlands that are
adjacent to traditional navigable waters.160 Adopting a classic purposivist
approach, the Court wrote,
Faced with such a problem of defining the bounds of its regulatory
authority, an agency may appropriately look to the legislative history
and underlying policies of its statutory grants of authority. . . .
[T]ogether they . . . support the reasonableness of the Corps’ approach of defining adjacent wetlands as “waters” within the meaning
of § 404(a). Section 404 originated as part of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, which constituted a comprehensive legislative attempt “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” This objective incorporated a broad, systemic view of the goal of maintaining
and improving water quality . . . . Protection of aquatic ecosystems,
Congress recognized, demanded broad federal authority to control
pollution, for “[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles, and it is essential
that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source.”161
While the Burger Court rarely cited § 101(b) in its Clean Water Act opinions, the Rehnquist Court cited § 101(b) in almost as many cases as it
cited § 101(a).162 In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Court
stressed the importance of state authority to regulate water pollution
under the Clean Water Act when the Court concluded that the law did
not preempt state common-law actions.163 Similarly, in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Court discussed the Clean Water Act’s § 101(b) policy of protecting states’ rights when it limited the federal government’s jurisdiction
over certain isolated waters, finding that it was necessary to read the statute narrowly to avoid infringing on traditional state responsibilities in
planning and developing land and water uses.164 That was the first time
159. Id. at 78.
160. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985).
161. Id. at 132–33 (fifth alteration in original) (citation omitted).
162. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. The Rehnquist Court cited § 101(b) in two
cases and cited § 101(a) in three cases. See id. The only case in which the Rehnquist Court
relied on § 101(a) in any significant way to support its reading of the Clean Water Act was
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101, 105–06 (1992). In that case, the Court upheld the
EPA’s decision to include discharge limits in a Clean Water Act permit to protect the water
quality of downstream states, in part because the limits advanced the water-quality protection purposes of § 101(a). See id. at 104–06.
163. See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490–91, 493–97 (1987).
164. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
166–67, 173 (2001).
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that the Court gave precedence to the policies of § 101(b) over the water
quality protection purposes of § 101(a) when they conflicted.
The shift in the focus on the purposes of the law has been most apparent, however, in the Roberts Court. To the extent that the Roberts Court
has focused on the water quality protection purposes of § 101(a) to interpret the Clean Water Act, it has done so only when the interpretation of
the law also advances the policies of § 101(b), and the Court has routinely
stressed the importance of both sections in interpreting the law.165 In S.D.
Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection, for instance, the
Court held that § 401, requiring state certification for federal permits, applied to a license for a hydroelectric power project because it advanced
the water quality protection purposes of the law and the policy of the law
to protect states’ rights to regulate water quality.166 Similarly, when the
Court in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund held that the Clean
Water Act requires permits for discharges through groundwater into navigable waters that are “the functional equivalent of a direct discharge
from the point source into navigable waters,” the Court adopted the test
as a tool to accommodate the dual objectives of protecting water quality
under § 101(a) and recognizing the role of states to regulate groundwater
under § 101(b), since groundwater was not directly regulated under the
Act.167 In an additional case, Rapanos v. United States, a plurality of the
Court narrowly interpreted “waters of the United States” under the Act
in order to advance the policy of § 101(b), even though the narrowed
interpretation would conflict with the water quality protection goals of
§ 101(a).168
The Court’s discussion of purpose in Clean Water Act cases has
changed in another important way over the years. As Professor Driesen
and his colleagues noted with respect to the Clean Air Act cases, when
the Burger Court issued decisions that could be seen as departing from
the water quality protection purposes of the Clean Water Act, the Court
usually attempted to justify its decisions as based on clear-statement canons or as somehow being consistent with the purposes of the law.169 For
instance, when the Court held in Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation that
the EPA could limit the opportunity for public hearings on § 402 permits,
the Court noted that Congress intended to provide for public participation and transparency in the permitting process; nonetheless, the Court
165. While the Court cited § 101(a) in two cases where it did not cite § 101(b), it cited
§ 101(a) in those cases only in boilerplate language describing the structure of the statute
and did not focus on the purpose in interpreting the statute in those cases. See supra note
150.
166. S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 385–86 (2006).
167. Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468–73 (2020).
168. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 737 (2006) (plurality opinion). Addressing
the reliance of Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion on § 101(a) as the basis for a “significant nexus” limit to jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water
Act, the plurality wrote, “clean water is not the only purpose of the statute. So is the
preservation of primary state responsibility for ordinary land-use decisions.” Id. at 755–56
(emphasis omitted).
169. See Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1843.
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argued that “the regulations the EPA has promulgated to implement this
congressional policy are fully consistent with the legislative purpose.”170
Similarly, when the Court held in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo that
courts are not required to enjoin pollution discharges that violate the
Clean Water Act, the Court wrote,
Although the ultimate objective of the [Clean Water Act] is to eliminate all discharges of pollutants into the navigable waters by 1985,
the statute sets forth a scheme of phased compliance. . . . This
scheme of phased compliance further suggests that this is a statute in
which Congress envisioned, rather than curtailed, the exercise of
discretion.171
Likewise, when the Court held in Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Natural Resources Defense Council that the EPA could issue variances from
effluent limitations for toxic pollutants despite seemingly clear language
in the statute that prohibited such variances, the Court wrote, “Neither
are we convinced that [EPA-developed fundamentally different factor
(FDF)] variances threaten to frustrate the goals and operation of the statutory scheme set up by Congress. . . . [The variances are], essentially, not
an exception to the standard-setting process, but rather a more fine-tuned
application of it.”172
The Rehnquist Court’s opinions followed a similar pattern. When the
Court held in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio that the federal
government could not be forced to pay civil penalties under the Clean
Water Act except to coerce compliance with a judicial order, the Court
relied on clear-statement canons regarding sovereign immunity.173 Similarly, when the Court limited the federal government’s jurisdiction over
certain isolated waters in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Court relied on clear-statement canons regarding federalism and avoiding potentially unconstitutional interpretations of statutes.174
When the Roberts Court interprets the Clean Water Act in ways that
seem to conflict with the water quality purposes of the law, however, the
Court no longer seems to feel any obligation to justify its readings of the
statute as compelled by clear-statement canons or to explain its decisions
as somehow consistent with the purposes of the law. Instead, the Court
ignores the purposes of the law in its analyses or focuses on the § 101(b)
policy of the statute as a more compelling goal, generating vigorous dissents from a cadre of Justices usually focusing on the water quality protection goals of § 101(a).175
170. Costle v. Pac. Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 216 (1980).
171. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 316 (1982).
172. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 129–30 (1985).
173. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992).
174. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 171–74 (2001).
175. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261,
301–02 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens & Souter, JJ.); Entergy Corp. v.
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The Supreme Court’s resolution of Clean Water Act disputes parallels
the Court’s resolution of Clean Air Act disputes in another important
way. In interpreting both statutes, the Court has moved from an era of
consensus at the time of the laws’ original enactments to an ideological
divide in interpreting the laws today.
During the Burger era, eight of the thirteen Clean Water Act opinions
(61%) were unanimous decisions, and eleven were joined by at least
seven Justices.176 That consensus dissolved quickly in the Rehnquist era,
given that only one of the seven opinions issued by the Rehnquist Court
was unanimous and almost half of the decisions (three out of seven) were
issued with a five-Justice majority.177 The Roberts Court has found consensus more frequently than the Rehnquist Court did—with the Roberts
Court issuing four unanimous decision out of ten—but has been deeply
divided in three of the six nonunanimous cases, with these three having
been decided by either a plurality or a five-Justice majority.178
More importantly, though, as consensus on the Court regarding Clean
Water Act issues has eroded, there has been a marked increase in ideological decision-making by the Court. I followed the same approach as
Professor Driesen and his colleagues, using Martin–Quinn scores to analyze the Court’s opinions and classify them as ideologically ordered or
disordered.179 As Professor Driesen and his colleagues concluded, I
found that the Court’s movement away from a purposivist approach to a
textualist approach in interpreting the Clean Water Act corresponded to
an increase in ideological ordering of the Court’s opinions.180 To the extent that ideological ordering of opinions correlates with ideological decision-making or activist decision-making, this analysis suggests that
textualism does not reduce the likelihood of activist or ideological decision-making by judges.
During the Burger Court era—in which the Court frequently examined
and discussed the purposes of the Clean Water Act—there were eight
unanimous opinions, and all of the five nonunanimous decisions were
ideologically disordered.181 As the Rehnquist Court moved away from
purposivism, or at least began to recast the central purpose of the Clean
Water Act, the Court reached one unanimous decision, four ideologically
Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 245 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter &
Ginsburg, JJ.); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 673–95
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.); Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 787 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsburg
& Breyer, JJ.).
176. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
177. See id.
178. See id. However, four of the Court’s last five opinions have been unanimous or
filed with only one dissent. See id.
179. See Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1843.
180. See infra notes 181–84.
181. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
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ordered decisions, and only two ideologically disordered opinions.182 The
shift to ideological decision-making has been the most pronounced, however, in the Roberts Court. Of the six decisions that were not unanimous,
five were ideologically ordered.183 Only one nonunanimous decision was
ideologically disordered.184
D. THE RISE

OF

STATES’ RIGHTS

While Professor Driesen and his colleagues found that the Supreme
Court has adopted a dynamic means of interpreting the Clean Air Act so
as to respond to climate change and political and elite views favoring
cost-benefit analysis,185 such a shift is not apparent in the Court’s Clean
Water Act decisions. Instead, beginning with the Rehnquist Court, the
Court’s opinions evince a shift toward a focus on limiting federal power
and protecting states’ rights when interpreting the statute.186 This is an
approach that many academics have attributed to the Rehnquist Court in
a wide variety of cases,187 and it was very apparent in the Clean Water
Act context.
During the Burger Court era, three of the first four cases involved interests of states,188 but none of the other nine decisions by the Court
involved any discussion of states’ rights, including Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, which involved a lawsuit brought by the Governor of Puerto
Rico and would have seemed to be a natural vehicle for some discussion
about federalism.189 Although limits on federal authority and protection
of states’ rights were not crucial issues in most of the Clean Water Act
decisions by the Burger Court, they took center stage during the Rehnquist era. Five of the seven Clean Water Act cases decided by the Court
centered on issues that had a strong impact on states’ rights, and the
Court’s opinions in four of those five cases supported the rights of the
states.190 In those cases, the Rehnquist Court held that the Clean Water
182. See id.
183. See id. The divide was most conspicuous in the early years of the Roberts Court,
with many 5–4 decisions pitting Justices Thomas, Alito, Scalia, Roberts, and Kennedy
against Justices Breyer, Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg.
184. See id. In Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, Justice Scalia filed a
solitary dissent, moving past two more conservative Justices (Thomas and Alito) who
joined the majority opinion. 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013).
185. See Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1843.
186. See infra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 238–51 and accompanying text.
188. See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 201
(1976) (addressing the authority of states to require federal facilities to obtain permits
from states); Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc., 420 U.S. 136, 137 (1975) (per curiam)
(addressing allotment of grant funds to states and local governments for publicly owned
waste treatment works); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975) (same).
189. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 307 (1982).
190. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 174 (2001); PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 723 (1994); U.S. Dep’t
of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 611 (1992); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 94 (1992);
Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987).
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Act (1) did not preempt state common-law actions,191 (2) authorized the
EPA to include conditions in § 402 permits to protect the water quality of
downstream states,192 (3) authorized states to include minimum stream
flow requirements in federal permits through the § 401 certification process,193 and (4) limited federal jurisdiction over waters that are primarily
regulated by states.194 The focus on states’ rights continued in the Roberts Court, as the first three Clean Water Act cases decided by the Court
involved states’ interests, and in each case, the majority or plurality ruled
in a way that favored the states’ interests.195 However, none of the remaining seven cases decided by the Roberts Court since then had involved any discussion of states’ rights until the recent decision in County
of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, where the Court discussed states’ authority to regulate groundwater under the Clean Water Act.196 That decision largely preserved the states’ authority, though it authorized federal
regulation over some discharges into navigable waters that flow through
groundwater.197
E. DO

THE

COURT’S DECISIONS PROTECT

THE

ENVIRONMENT?

In the almost half century since Congress enacted the Clean Water Act,
only about one-third of the Supreme Court opinions interpreting the law
have adopted a reading of the statute that could be characterized as “proenvironment” in the sense that the opinion advances the water quality
protection goals of the Clean Water Act or adopts a position advocated
by environmental groups.198 During the Burger era, when the Court first
began interpreting the law, five of the thirteen decisions (about 40%)
could be characterized as pro-environment.199 There were several notable
environmental victories during the Burger era, including decisions that
prevented the EPA from limiting funding for sewage treatment plants,200
upheld the agency’s authority to set technology-based standards by regulation (and to do so without providing variances for new sources),201 upheld the EPA’s decision not to authorize variances from best practicable
191. See Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 497.
192. See Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 106–07.
193. See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 723.
194. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty., 531 U.S. at 174.
195. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 649 (2007)
(finding that the Endangered Species Act does not impose additional limits on delegation
of § 402 programs to states); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 737–38 (2006) (plurality opinion) (limiting federal jurisdiction over nonnavigable tributaries, in light of concerns
regarding interference with states’ rights); S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547
U.S. 370, 373 (2006) (finding that § 401 certification applies to federal license for hydroelectric power generation).
196. See Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1471–73 (2020).
197. Id.
198. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. Ten or eleven of the thirty opinions could
be characterized as pro-environment. See infra notes 199–211.
199. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
200. See Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc., 420 U.S. 136, 137–38 (1975) (per curiam);
Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 38–39, 41 (1975).
201. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 (1977).
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technology standards based on economic factors,202 and upheld the government’s authority to regulate wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable
waters.203
The winning percentage for the environment was highest during the
Rehnquist era, in which three or four of the seven decisions could be
characterized as pro-environment,204 including decisions finding that the
law did not preempt state common-law remedies,205 that the EPA could
include conditions in § 402 permits to protect the water quality of downstream states,206 that states could include minimum streamflow conditions in § 401 certifications for federal permits,207 and that permits could
be required for pollution discharges that pass through a non-point source
from a point source to navigable waters.208 Many of the Court’s decisions
that advanced states’ rights coincidentally advanced the water quality
protection goals of the Clean Water Act.
Although eight or nine of the twenty cases decided during the Burger
and Rehnquist eras could be characterized as pro-environment, very few
of the cases decided during the Roberts era meet that standard.209 Of the
ten opinions issued by the Court, only the cases of S.D. Warren Co. v.
Maine Board of Environmental Protection (finding that § 401 certification
applies to federal hydroelectric power licensing)210 and County of Maui v.
Hawaii Wildlife Fund (finding that § 402 permits are required for activities that are the “functional equivalent” of a direct discharge to navigable
waters from a point source)211 would qualify as pro-environment. The
Roberts Court’s 20% pro-environment record is the major reason why
the Court’s overall record hovers around 30%, whereas the record during
the Burger and Rehnquist eras was closer to 40% or 50%.
As the Court’s decisions have more consistently strayed away from
pro-environmental outcomes, the rhetoric used by the Court has changed
as well. In the early years of the Clean Water Act, the Burger Court’s
opinions rarely complained about unfair burdens imposed by the law on
regulated entities. Instead, the Court’s opinions frequently expressed support for the EPA’s efforts to implement a massive regulatory statute with
limited resources. For instance, when the Court in Costle v. Pacific Legal
Foundation upheld the EPA’s decision to limit opportunities for public
hearings for § 402 permits, the Court wrote,
[E]ach year the EPA grants about 100 requests for adjudicatory
hearings under the [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
(2004).
209.
210.
211.

See EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 85 (1980).
See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987).
See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 106–07 (1992).
PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 723 (1994).
See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 104–05
See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006).
Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1476 (2020).
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tem (NPDES)] program, issues about 2,200 permits, and takes
thousands of actions with respect to permits. Affirmance of the
Court of Appeals’ rationale obviously would raise serious questions
about the EPA’s ability to administer the NPDES program.212
Similarly, when the Court in Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. upheld the EPA’s decision to grant variances from effluent limits for discharges of toxic chemicals, the Court
wrote,
[T]he availability of FDF variances makes bearable the enormous
burden faced by EPA in promulgating categories of sources and setting effluent limitations. Acting under stringent timetables, EPA
must collect and analyze large amounts of technical information concerning complex industrial categories. Understandably, EPA may not
be apprised of and will fail to consider unique factors applicable to
atypical plants during the categorical rulemaking process, and it is
thus important that EPA’s nationally binding categorical pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers be tempered with the flexibility that the FDF variance mechanism offers, a mechanism repugnant
to neither the goals nor the operation of the Act.213
While the Burger Court frequently expressed sympathy for the EPA
and upheld many agency actions that would impose costly requirements
on regulated entities,214 the Roberts Court has frequently criticized the
federal government’s imposition of regulatory burdens through environmental laws on businesses and individuals. Consider, for instance, the plurality’s description of the § 404 permitting program in Rapanos v. United
States:
The burden of federal regulation on those who would deposit fill material in locations denominated “waters of the United States” is not
trivial. In deciding whether to grant or deny a permit, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an enlightened despot . . . . The average applicant for an individual permit
spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and
$28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design changes.215
Similarly, in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, the Court held that the EPA
could consider costs in setting standards for cooling water intakes because the law certainly should not be interpreted “as to require the EPA
to require industry petitioners to spend billions to save one more fish or
212. Costle v. Pac. Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 215 (1980) (citations omitted).
213. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 132–33 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985)
(requiring permits for discharges of dredged or fill material into wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters); EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 85 (1980) (EPA is
not required to provide variances from effluent limits based on best practicable technology); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138–39 (1977) (EPA not
required to provide variances from effluent limits for new sources).
215. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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plankton.”216 In Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council, the Court held that slurry discharges required a permit under
§ 404 instead of § 402, in part because the Court was concerned about the
difficulty for dischargers to determine whether the material would be
“subject to one of the many hundreds of EPA performance standards.”217
Finally, in Sackett v. EPA, the Court held that the EPA’s administrative
orders could be reviewed in court because the Court wanted to avoid an
interpretation that would authorize the agency to “strong arm[ ] . . . regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance.’”218 The Roberts Court opinions
adopt an antiregulatory rhetorical tone noticeably absent in the early Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Clean Water Act.
VI. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE SUPREME
COURT’S TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
There is some disagreement among academics regarding the Supreme
Court’s general attitude toward environmental law. Professor Daniel Farber, for instance, has argued that the Court has been largely irrelevant
and ineffectual in shaping environmental law because the Court generally
hears cases with quirky facts that do not raise issues of broad significance,
avoids deciding cases on the merits, and—when it does decide cases on
the merits—defers to agencies or resolves issues on narrow technical
grounds.219 Others have argued that the Court has been openly hostile to
environmental law in its rulings220 or that its rulings are gradually eroding
environmental law.221 Professor Richard Lazarus does not believe that
the Court has been hostile to environmental law; instead, he argues that
the Court has been indifferent to the goals of environmental law and has
not appreciated environmental law as a distinct area of law.222 Nevertheless, he raises concerns that the Court’s indifference to those goals can
lead to substantial losses in environmental quality and public health.223
Based on his review of 240 environmental law cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1969 and 1998, Lazarus warned that the voting
records of the Justices indicated that the Court was becoming less responsive to environmental concerns over time.224 A few years later, Professor
216. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009).
217. Coeur Alaska v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 276–77 (2009).
218. Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 131 (2012).
219. See Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant? Reflections on the Judicial
Role in Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 547, 548, 560–62 (1997).
220. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the
Supreme Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 421 (1989).
221. See Lin, supra note 86, at 568.
222. See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental
Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 706 (2000).
223. Id. at 706–07.
224. Id. at 708, 735–36. In addition to scoring the Justices on their environmental voting
records, Lazarus examined which Justices wrote the most majority opinions in environmental cases and which Justices joined the majority most frequently in environmental cases.
During the study period, Justice White wrote the most opinions (thirty-six) by a large margin, but his opinions did not exhibit any environmental ethic. Id. at 709. In fact, Lazarus
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Albert Lin warned that the Supreme Court was gradually eroding environmental law by employing textualism, various tools of statutory interpretation, and principles of federalism.225 A similar pattern is apparent
from the review of the Court’s Clean Water Act opinions through the
current term, which increasingly fail to protect the environment or advance the law’s water quality protection goals.226
Although academics disagree about the Supreme Court’s overall attitude toward environmental law and its long-term effect on the development of environmental law, they do agree on many issues, and my
findings regarding the Clean Water Act cases are consistent with many of
their more general findings regarding environmental law. For instance,
many academics have observed the central role that the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts played in shaping environmental policy in the
1970s and 1980s by interpreting the federal environmental laws to promote their environmental protection purposes.227 The Burger Court was
instrumental in the implementation of the Clean Water Act in its early
years, reviewing almost as many challenges to the law in the first fourteen
years after it was enacted as the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts reviewed
in the subsequent twenty-four years.228
Despite the early aggressive review of the environmental laws, academics have noted that the Court’s role in interpreting those laws to advance
their purposes has waned over time. Professors Robert Glicksman and
Christopher Schroeder suggest that several factors influenced the shift in
the Court’s attitude toward reviewing environmental laws in the 1980s
and beyond.229 First, they argue that public choice theory replaced the
legal process theory in the political landscape, so that the legislative process was viewed more skeptically after the 1980s, and courts were less
likely to issue opinions that focused on implementing the purposes of legislation.230 Second, they argue that there was a shift in the attitude toward
agencies in the 1980s from distrust based on agency capture to confidence
argues that his “opinions fail to suggest that the environmental dimension of the case
played any independent role in the Court’s decision or reasoning.” Id. While Justice White
wrote the most opinions in environmental cases during the study period, Justice Kennedy
joined with the majority most frequently during the study period, voting with the majority
in more than 96% of the cases. Id. at 713.
225. See Lin, supra note 86, at 571–72. Lin warned that the Court was, as forecast by
Professor Farber, acting as an immune system toward environmental regulation, not eliminating it but subsuming it within the existing legal order and minimizing change beyond
Congress’s express mandates. See id. at 634 (citing Farber, supra note 219, at 563–68).
226. See supra Section V.E.
227. See Stephen M. Johnson, The Brand X Effect: Declining Chevron Deference for
EPA and Increased Success for Environmental Groups in the 21st Century, 69 CASE W.
RSRV. L. REV. 65, 66–67 (2018); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court: Highlights from the Blackmun Papers, 35 ENV’T L. REP. 10637, 10637–38 (2005);
Lazarus, supra note 222, at 704; Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and
the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 256 (1991).
228. The Burger Court reviewed thirteen challenges, while the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts reviewed seventeen challenges combined. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
229. See Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 227, at 256–57.
230. Id.
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in the expertise and accountability of agencies.231 That shift was embodied in the Supreme Court’s Chevron decision, which encouraged courts to
defer to agency interpretations of statutes when the statutes are unclear.232 Finally, they argue that the shine had worn off environmental
values by the 1980s, so they were treated as coequal with other values,
and there was no reason for courts to aggressively review EPA decisions
to protect those values.233 Professor Robert Percival suggests another
reason for the Court’s disengagement from aggressive review of environmental statutes based on his review of the papers of Justice Blackmun.234
Percival notes that the historical papers reflected that the Justices were
uncomfortable with the complicated nature of the complex environmental statutes235 and that the Chevron doctrine was “in part a product of the
Justices’ difficulty understanding the complexities of the [Clean Air
Act].”236 Regardless of what caused the shift in the Court’s review of
environmental law generally, the shift was apparent in the review of the
Clean Water Act cases, as the Court significantly reduced its focus on
interpreting the law to carry out its water quality purposes since the Burger era.237
The Court’s shift toward hearing more Clean Water Act cases involving
states’ rights and focusing more on the § 101(b) policy of the Clean Water
Act during the Rehnquist era is also not surprising in light of the Court’s
history. The revival of federalism is often cited as a signature feature of
the Rehnquist Court.238 From the time of the New Deal until the Rehnquist Court, the Supreme Court rarely sought to limit federal authority in
favor of state authority, and the Court did not invalidate any federal law
from 1936 until 1995 as exceeding Congress’s enumerated powers.239
However, Justice Rehnquist was a strong advocate for limiting federal
power and strengthening state power from the time he joined the Court
in 1972,240 and he was joined in his crusade by a stable voting bloc shortly
231. Id. at 257, 286–88, 295.
232. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984).
233. See Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 227, at 257.
234. See Percival, supra note 227, at 10638.
235. Id. at 10644, 10663. According to Percival, “The Blackmun papers show a Court
whose Justices often express bewilderment, or even contempt, for the new laws and the
regulatory programs they spawn.” Id. at 10663.
236. Id. at 10663.
237. See supra Section V.B.
238. See Mark Latham, The Rehnquist Court and the Pollution Control Cases: AntiEnvironmental and Pro-Business?, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 135–36 (2007); Peter J.
Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 906, 907–08 (2006); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double
Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 76 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme
Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13–14 (2001); Calvin
Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 438 (2002).
239. See Latham, supra note 238, at 146–47; Adler, supra note 31, at 379; Percival, supra
note 227, at 10646.
240. See Percival, supra note 227, at 10646. Justice Rehnquist’s appointment corresponds to the time at which many of the major federal environmental laws were first enacted, and he had many opportunities to shape the development of those laws over his
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after he took over as Chief Justice.241
The Rehnquist Court reinvigorated federalism by issuing several decisions that imposed limits on federal authority under the Commerce
Clause or the Spending Clause and limited preemption of state regulatory
authority.242 In addition, the Court deemphasized reliance on the Chevron doctrine and used other statutory interpretation tools, such as the
canon to avoid interference with traditional state responsibilities, to limit
federal authority in favor of states.243 Many of those cases were decided
by a single vote, with the same 5–4 voting split in each case.244 As noted
above, the Court used many of those approaches in the Clean Water Act
context,245 although there was only one Clean Water Act case where the
Court divided along its traditional lines.246
In light of the Rehnquist Court’s philosophical shift, some commentators labeled the Court as anti-environment and pro-business, and were
concerned that the Court could cripple federal environmental regulation.247 Others were more sanguine and argued that, although the Court’s
opinions created opportunities to significantly weaken environmental
laws, the Court generally did not strike down major provisions of envithirty-three years on the Court. See James R. May & Robert L. Glicksman, Justice Rehnquist and the Dismantling of Environmental Law, 36 ENV’T L. REP. 10585, 10585–86 (2006).
He authored eighty-four opinions in environmental cases over his career, more than any
other Justice. Id. at 10586.
241. Of particular importance in the shift on the Court was the replacement of Justice
Marshall with Justice Thomas in 1992. See Percival, supra note 227, at 10637–38. From 1994
until 2005, there was no change in the membership of the Court, and Chief Justice Rehnquist was able to rely on his colleagues to hand down multiple decisions that reinvigorated
federalism. Id. at 10650–51; see also Latham, supra note 238, at 144–47; Adler, supra note
31, at 379; Young, supra note 238, at 2–4 (discussing the decade long service of the members of the Court at the time and the limits on federal authority adopted by the majority
voting bloc over that time). When the nine Justices of the Rehnquist Court served together
for a decade, it was the longest time that any group of Justices had served together since
the 1820s. See Young, supra note 238, at 5–6, 6 n.11 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The Making
of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 577
(2003)).
242. See Adler, supra note 31, at 379, 389–90; May & Glicksman, supra note 240, at
10586–87, 10615; Latham, supra note 238, at 144, 146–47.
243. See Adler, supra note 31, at 389; May & Glicksman, supra note 240, at 10586,
10590, 10593–96, 10600; Latham, supra note 238, at 144, 146–47.
244. Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas usually joined the Chief Justice
in the majority, with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissenting. See Smith,
supra note 238, at 914–15; Young, supra note 238, at 6.
245. See supra Section V.D.
246. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 162 (2001). Although there were two other Clean Water Act cases that were decided
with a majority of five Justices, neither involved the traditional 5–4 split with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissenting. See Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake
Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 52 (1987); Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 483 (1987).
247. See Latham, supra note 238, at 133–34; May & Glicksman, supra note 240, at
10586–87, 10615; Jeffrey G. Miller, The Supreme Court’s Water Pollution Jurisprudence: Is
the Court All Wet?, 24 VA. ENV’T L.J. 125, 125 (2005); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 4 (2003); see also Adler, supra note
31, at 379–80, 403–05, 420–21.
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ronmental laws or otherwise fundamentally dismantle the laws.248 This
was true in the Clean Water Act context as well. Other than the Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County decision, which imposed significant limits on federal jurisdiction over the nation’s waters,249 most of the
Rehnquist Court’s Clean Water Act decisions advanced the water quality
protection goals of the law while empowering states.250 Although the
Rehnquist Court heard the fewest Clean Water Act cases, its record for
issuing decisions that favor the environment is better than that of the
Burger or Roberts Courts.251
VII. CONGRESS’S DIMINISHING ROLE IN OVERSEEING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Coinciding with the Supreme Court’s shift away from interpreting the
Clean Water Act to advance its water quality purposes, Congress has
greatly reduced its oversight of the implementation of the law, as well as
most other environmental laws. In the 1970s, Congress not only adopted
most of the major federal environmental laws with broad bipartisan support but also kept a close eye on judicial interpretation of the laws and
routinely passed legislation to affirm or overrule court decisions.252 In
that way, Congress ensured that the laws would continue to be enforced
to achieve their rights-based purposes.253
However, at least since the 1990s, Congress has disengaged from that
practice. There have been no new major federal environmental laws and
only one major amendment to federal environmental laws in three decades, and Congress has not enacted legislation to overturn or affirm judicial interpretations of the federal environmental laws in nearly as
long.254 Professor Driesen and his colleagues made similar findings in
their review of the Supreme Court’s Clean Air Act decisions,255 and
Professors Matthew Christiansen and William Eskridge found that Congress has rarely acted to overturn judicial interpretations of any statute—
248. See Latham, supra note 238, at 153–54, 165–66, 175–78; Adler, supra note 31, at
385–87.
249. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty., 531 U.S. at 162.
250. See supra Section V.D.
251. See supra Section V.E.
252. See Zellmer, supra note 5, at 2323, 2328–35; Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional
Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619,
621, 624–25 (2006); see also Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1317, 1317 (2014) (discussing congressional overrides in general, rather than limited to the context of environmental laws).
253. See Zellmer, supra note 5, at 2340.
254. See Lazarus, supra note 252, at 621–22, 629; Zellmer, supra note 5, at 2324 (noting
the lack of congressional action in the environmental arena since 1990, despite environmental catastrophes like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and specifically noting the lack of
congressional response to judicial interpretations of the Clean Water Act). The only major
amendment to a federal environmental statute was the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical
Safety for the 21st Century Act, passed in 2016 to amend the Toxics Substances Control
Act. See Pub. L. No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 448 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2601).
255. See Driesen et al., supra note 12, at 1851–52.
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environmental or otherwise—since 1999.256
To the extent that Congress has adopted any changes to the environmental laws, it has increasingly relied on using the appropriations process
to impose ad hoc, temporary limits on federal agencies’ use of funds to
enforce policies that a small minority of Congress oppose.257 The appropriations process does not provide for the meaningful public deliberation
and debate that surrounded the initial adoption of the federal environmental laws.258 Academics suggest several reasons for the reduction in
congressional overrides and the shift to appropriations legislation as a
vehicle to address environmental matters, including declining bipartisanship, a distrust of science, and a belief that agencies have greater expertise in the complex arena of environmental matters and have the ability,
pursuant to the Chevron259 and Brand X260 decisions, to fix judicial errors
in interpreting the environmental laws, as long as courts have not held
that the laws provide clear answers to the environmental disputes.261 As
Professor Richard Lazarus has noted, though, congressional disengagement is particularly problematic in the area of environmental law since
there is a need to fine-tune environmental regulation to implement the
laws effectively.262
The general trend across environmental law observed by academics has
played out in the Clean Water Act context as well. The law was enacted
with overwhelming bipartisan support in the House and Senate in
256. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 252, at 1318–19, 1340 (finding that congressional overrides fell dramatically after a “golden age” from 1991–1999); Adam Liptak,
In Congress’s Paralysis, a Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012, at A10;
Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and
Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013). Christiansen and Eskridge also found that
Congress has not acted to override any Supreme Court decision interpreting an environmental statute since 1998. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 252, at 1368–69.
257. See Lazarus, supra note 252, at 632–33, 638, 647–48. Lazarus suggests that the shift
to the appropriations process has been caused by changes in congressional rules, the demise of bipartisanship, and increased politicization of the appropriations and budgetary
processes. Id. at 622. Lazarus uses the compilation of “Anti-Environmental Riders” from
around the turn of the 21st century as an example for this manner of appropriations. Id. at
647.
258. Id. at 632–33.
259. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
260. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
261. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 252, at 1343–44, 1385–87 (addressing partisanship in congressional overrides and deference to agencies in fixing judicial mistakes);
Zellmer, supra note 5, at 2326, 2372–73 (regarding congressional partisanship, disdain for
science, and heated rhetoric demonizing environmental regulation); Lazarus, supra note
252, at 622 (identifying the lack of partisanship as one of the reasons for the shift to the
appropriations process). See Johnson, supra note 227, at 78–81, for a discussion of agencies’ powers to overturn judicial interpretations of statutes after Brand X. Professor Sandra
Zellmer also suggests that Congress’s failure to act in the environmental arena is caused, in
part, because many of the pressing environmental problems of the 1970s have been addressed, and the remaining problems are more complex and more controversial. See
Zellmer, supra note 5, at 2372–73. She also suggests that the political parties no longer
perceive that there is the same level of public support for environmental laws as existed in
the 1970s. Id. at 2374–77.
262. See Lazarus, supra note 252, at 630, 662.
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1972,263 and for the first decade and a half after it was enacted, Congress
vigilantly observed judicial implementation of the law and routinely
passed laws to affirm or overturn decisions by the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts interpreting the law. For instance, after the Supreme
Court held in EPA v. California ex rel State Water Resources Control
Board that federal facilities were not required to obtain § 402 permits
from states with delegated programs,264 Congress amended the law to
overturn the decision.265 Then, when the Court held in Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. that the EPA
could issue variances from effluent limits for toxic pollutants despite
seemingly clear statutory language prohibiting such variances,266 Congress amended the law to explicitly authorize the variances.267 During the
first decade and a half of the Clean Water Act’s existence, Congress also
took action in response to judicial interpretations issued by the lower federal courts. For instance, after the D.C. Circuit in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle struck down EPA regulations that exempted
various point sources from the permit requirements of the Clean Water
Act,268 Congress amended the law to exempt some agricultural activities
from regulation as point sources.269 Similarly, after the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Train approved a settlement in a lawsuit challenging the EPA’s
regulation of toxic water pollutants,270 Congress used the settlement as a
model for amendments to the law that dramatically changed the approach used to address those pollutants.271
Since the 1990s, however, Congress has not made any changes to the
Clean Water Act to affirm or overturn interpretations of the law by the
Supreme Court or lower federal courts.272 Congress’s lack of action is not
due to a lack of opportunities, though. After all, the Court has issued four
opinions regarding the Clean Water Act jurisdiction over “waters of the
United States,” and Congress has not taken any action to affirm or overturn those decisions (unless one views congressional inaction to be approval of judicial precedent).273 Similarly, Congress has not taken any
263. See supra note 40.
264. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 227–28
(1976).
265. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 60, 61(a), 91 Stat. 1566,
1597–98 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323).
266. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 133 (1985).
267. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 306, 101 Stat. 7, 35 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314, 1317).
268. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
269. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(b), 91 Stat. 1566, 1577 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362).
270. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Train, Nos. 2153-73, 75-172, 75-1698, 75-1267, 1976
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14700, at *8–9 (D.D.C. June 9, 1976).
271. See Water Quality Act §§ 301–02.
272. See Zellmer, supra note 5, at 2339–46 (discussing congressional silence in the wake
of numerous Supreme Court Clean Water Act decisions).
273. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 624 (2018); Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 757 (2006) (plurality opinion); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
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action when it is clear that the law is not meeting its objectives, as is
evident regarding the regulation of non-point source pollution.274
For decades, Congress has failed to act despite strong public support
for greater protection of the nation’s waters. In a 2019 Pew Research poll,
68% of respondents felt that the federal government was not doing
enough to protect the water quality of rivers, lakes, and streams.275 And
63% of respondents felt that stricter environmental regulations were
worth the cost.276 Similarly, in a 2017 “Survey of American Fears” conducted by Chapman University, respondents identified pollution of
oceans, rivers, and lakes as the number three fear, trailing only government corruption and healthcare.277 This public sentiment is not new: in a
2011 Gallup poll, three out of four respondents said they worry about
pollution of rivers, lakes, and reservoirs,278 and in 1997, Money Magazine
subscribers identified clean water as the number two priority (out of
forty-one priorities identified) in evaluating places to live.279 Although
environmentalists might find it regrettable that Congress has not acted to
respond to those public concerns, some commentators argue that supporters of clean water are fortunate that Congress has not taken any action because congressional action would likely weaken—rather than
strengthen—the law.280
VIII. SHIFT IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Water quality could still be protected under the Clean Water Act, despite the Supreme Court’s trend away from interpreting the law to fulfill
its § 101(a) goals and Congress’s disengagement in oversight of the law,
so long as the federal agencies aggressively interpret and administer the
law to carry out its water quality protection goals, especially in light of
Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985). Professor Sandra Zellmer argues that,
in addition to those decisions, Congress has ignored several other important Clean Water
Act decisions that have established broad, sweeping requirements, including the Sackett
and Coeur Alaska decisions. See Zellmer, supra note 5, at 2340–47.
274. See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
275. Cary Funk and Brian Kennedy, How Americans See Climate Change and the Environment in 7 Charts, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/04/21/how-americans-see-climate-change-and-the-environment-in-7-charts/
[https://perma.cc/59UP-Y8DE].
276. Id. The issue is partisan, however, as 81% of Democrats and independents who
lean Democrat support stricter regulation, while only 45% of Republicans and independents who lean Republican support stricter regulation. Id.
277. Mitch Tobin, Water Pollution near Top of America’s Fears, WATERPOLLS.ORG
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://waterpolls.org/chapman-fears-survey-2017 [https://perma.cc/F9BB99TW].
278. See Zellmer, supra note 5, at 2378.
279. See Caputo, supra note 34, at 10574 n.9.
280. See Zellmer, supra note 5, at 2327. Professor Sandra Zellmer argues that congressional inaction may be preferable because (1) the existing statutory framework is strong,
(2) Congress is subject to capture by regulated entities, and (3) the courts can invalidate
agency action that is contrary to the Clean Water Act or is arbitrary and capricious. Id. at
237984.
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the deference that should be accorded to the agencies’ statutory interpretation under Chevron and Brand X.281
Chevron deference has made a difference when the Supreme Court has
applied it in interpreting the Clean Water Act. In seven of the eight cases
where a majority of the Court relied on Chevron to resolve the statutory
interpretation issue, the government’s interpretation prevailed.282 The
government’s 87% success rate in those Chevron cases is significantly better than the government’s 64% success rate in Clean Water Act cases
decided before Chevron or its 60% success rate in cases decided after
Chevron where Chevron was not applied.283 Thus, if the government was
aggressively interpreting the Clean Water Act to carry out its § 101(a)
goals and if courts were routinely applying Chevron to resolve statutory
interpretation questions, federal agencies could slow the erosion of the
protection of the nation’s waters under the Clean Water Act.
However, over the past few decades, the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have created exceptions to Chevron and have increasingly
avoided the use of Chevron to review agencies’ statutory interpretations.284 Indeed, the Court has not utilized the Chevron analysis in any of
the Clean Water Act cases decided since 2009.285
Even if the Court were continuing to use the Chevron analysis to review statutory interpretation issues under the Clean Water Act, the environment would not necessarily benefit, because the federal government
281. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. Studies have generally found that the
government’s position is upheld in about three-fourths of the statutory interpretation cases
when courts apply Chevron analysis. See Johnson, supra note 227, at 69–71; Christopher H.
Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENV’T L. REP. 10371, 10377 (2001) (EPA prevailed in 75.7% of
Chevron challenges in federal appellate courts in the 1990s); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light
on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30–31 (1998) (federal agencies prevailed in 73% of Chevron challenges
in federal appellate courts between 1995 and 1996); Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker,
Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017); (federal appellate courts
upheld agency interpretations in 77.4% of Chevron cases decided between 2003 and 2013).
282. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. Not surprisingly, in all of the cases where
the Court upheld the government’s position, it resolved the statutory interpretation question at Step Two of Chevron, and in all of the cases where the Court rejected the government’s position, it resolved the statutory interpretation question at Step One. See id.
Although a plurality of the Court, citing Chevron, struck down the government’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006), an
equal number of dissenting Justices upheld the government’s interpretation under Chevron
in that case. Id. at 810. Accordingly, it is not included in the CWA Spreadsheet as a case
where the Court upheld or struck down the government’s interpretation under Chevron.
283. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. The Court upheld the position supported by
the government in seven of the eleven cases that the Court decided prior to the Chevron
decision and upheld the position supported by the government in six of the ten post-Chevron cases where the Court did not use the Chevron analysis. See id.
284. See Johnson, supra note 227, at 77–78, 80–81 (discussing the erosion of Chevron
deference in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts as well as judicial criticism of the
doctrine and legislative attempts to rescind it); Note, supra note 86, at 1238–43 (discussing
the “major questions” doctrine and the Court’s increasing practice of ignoring Chevron
without comment); Zellmer, supra note 5, at 2384 (noting that federal courts are now
“more sympathetic to conservative, antiregulatory arguments than progressive ones”).
285. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
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has not been interpreting and administering the law to achieve its
§ 101(a) water quality protection goals. The Trump Administration focused heavily on deregulation and interpreting the law to provide much
more authority to states in lieu of the federal government, as is apparent
in the recent navigable waters protection rule and guidance regarding
regulation of point source discharges through groundwater.286 Even
before the Trump Administration took power, though, there was a significant change in the nature of the actions that the Supreme Court reviewed
under the Clean Water Act: in more and more cases, the government was
advocating for positions advanced by regulated entities, and these positions seemed at odds with the law’s water quality protection goals.287
When that is coupled with the Court’s increasing focus on § 101(b) and
congressional inaction, none of the three branches of government have
been working to advance the goals of § 101(a).
During the early years of the Clean Water Act in the Burger era, almost half of the cases heard by the Supreme Court involved either challenges to strict government regulation or limits on challenges to
government action.288 The pattern was even more pronounced during the
Rehnquist era, when five of the seven cases heard by the Court involved
challenges to strict government regulation or limits on challenging government action.289 The Roberts Court stands in stark contrast to the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, though. During the Roberts era, most of the
Court’s cases involved challenges to government action that reduced regulatory burdens.290
286. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
287. See infra notes 288–302 and accompanying text.
288. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. Six of the thirteen cases decided by the
Court involved challenger to strict government regulation or limits on challenges to government action. See id. The cases that involved challenges to strict government regulation
were United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); and
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). See CWA Spreadsheet, supra
note 135. The cases that addressed limits on the ability to challenge government actions
were Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981) and Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980). See CWA Spreadsheet,
supra note 135.
289. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. The cases that involved challenges to strict
government regulation were Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); PUD No. 1. v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987); and International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. The case that addressed limits on challenging government action was Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503
U.S. 607 (1992). See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
290. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. Six of the ten cases in the Roberts Court
involved challenges to government action that reduced regulatory burdens. See id. Those
cases were County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020); Decker v.
Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 568 U.S. 597 (2013); Los Angeles County Flood
Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 568 U.S. 78 (2013); Coeur
Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009); Entergy Corp.
v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009); and National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007). See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
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The federal government’s role in the Clean Water Act cases that are
heard by the Court has also changed dramatically over the years. During
the Burger Court, the United States was frequently the petitioner to the
Court, or at least a party: in eleven of the thirteen cases heard by the
Burger Court, the United States was the petitioner or cross-petitioner,
and in one of the remaining two cases, the EPA was a party.291 After the
Burger era, however, the United States has rarely been the petitioner in
Clean Water Act cases292 and was a party in only about half of the other
cases.293
Although the United States has participated less frequently as a petitioner or party in Clean Water Act cases over the years, the government
has continued to play an important role in those cases, frequently filing
amicus briefs. In the cases where the United States has not been a petitioner or party, the government has increasingly filed briefs supporting
the positions advanced by regulated entities, rather than the positions advanced by environmental groups. During the Burger Court, there were
no cases where the United States filed an amicus brief in support of positions advanced by regulated entities, and the United States was a co-petitioner with regulated entities in only two of the thirteen cases heard
during that era.294 During the Rehnquist era, the United States filed amicus briefs supporting the position advanced by regulated entities in one
case but filed opposing briefs in three other cases.295 In the Roberts
Court, though, the United States has been a co-petitioner with regulated
entities or filed amicus briefs in support of those entities in six of the ten
cases and filed an amicus brief opposing the position advanced by regulated entities in only a single case.296
As the government has shifted to support the arguments advanced by
regulated entities, the government has had great success persuading the
Court to adopt interpretations of the statute that favor those entities.
During the Roberts era, until the Court rejected the United States’ position in County of Maui, the Court upheld the positions advanced by the

291. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
292. Id. The United States was only the petitioner in two of the seven cases during the
Rehnquist era and one case (out of ten) during the Roberts era. Id. The federal government was last a petitioner in 2007, in the National Ass’n of Home Builders case. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. The United States and regulated entities were co-petitioners in the cases of
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority and Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n. Id.
295. Id. The United States opposed the position taken by regulated entities in International Paper, Co.; Gwaltney of Smithfield; and PUD No. 1 and supported the position taken
by regulated entities in the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians case. Id.
296. Id. The United States was a co-petitioner with regulated entities in National Ass’n
of Home Builders and filed amicus briefs supporting regulated entities in Entergy Corp.;
Coeur Alaska, Inc.; Los Angeles County Flood Control District; Decker; and County of
Maui. Id. The only case in which the United States filed an amicus brief opposing the
position taken by regulated entities was S.D. Warren Co., the first Clean Water Act case of
the Roberts Court. Id.
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government, supporting regulated entities, in all five cases.297 Until
County of Maui, there was a clear pattern in the Roberts Court: When
the government supported the arguments advanced by regulated entities,
the government won.
Over the past fifteen years, the Roberts Court has gone to great lengths
to uphold the government’s positions in Clean Water Act cases when the
government is advocating for regulated entities. In three of the cases, the
Court cited Auer v. Robbins298 to support its ruling, despite the fact that
the Auer doctrine has been falling out of favor more generally with the
Court over time.299 None of the Clean Water Act cases decided by the
Rehnquist or Burger Courts relied on Auer or its predecessor, Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co.300 As noted above, when the government has
supported the positions advanced by regulated entities in the Roberts
Court, the Court has upheld those positions in 83% of the cases.301 Over
the fifty-year history of the Clean Water Act, though, the Supreme Court
has generally upheld positions supported by the government in only 67%
of the cases.302
A few other facts regarding the Supreme Court’s review of Clean
Water Act cases over the past half century deserve mention. First, none
of the thirty Clean Water Act statutory interpretation cases came to the
Court through a petition from an environmental or public interest organization.303 Second, the Supreme Court reversed 83% of the lower court
decisions that it reviewed.304 Appeals from federal courts fared worst, as
the Court reversed 89% of those decisions while upholding the only two
297. Id. The Court adopted the position advanced by the government, supporting regulated entities, in the National Ass’n of Home Builders; Entergy Corp.; Coeur Alaska, Inc.;
L.A. County Flood Control District; Decker; and County of Maui cases. Id.
298. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
299. See Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 601 (2013); Coeur Alaska, Inc. v.
Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 274–75 (2009); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 672 (2007). For a discussion of the erosion of Auer
deference, see Christopher S. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature
Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 105–08 (2018).
300. See generally 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
301. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
302. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. The Court upheld positions supported by
the government in twenty of the thirty cases. Id. The percentage at which the Court upheld
positions supported by the government was highest during the Rehnquist Court (71%—
five of seven cases), followed by the Burger Court (69%—nine of thirteen cases) and the
Roberts Court (60%—six of ten cases). See id. In cases where the government was a party,
the government’s position has prevailed in 65% of the cases (thirteen of twenty), but its
winning percentage has steadily declined from the Burger Court (75%—nine of twelve
cases) through the Rehnquist Court (67%—two of three cases) to the Roberts Court
(40%—two of five cases). See id.
303. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135.
304. Id. The Court reversed twenty-five of the thirty decisions from lower courts. Id. In
two of the cases where the Court affirmed the lower court, the Court actually only affirmed
the decisions in part, while reversing in part. Id. The 83% reversal rate in Clean Water Act
cases is higher than the 60%–75% reversal rate that academics have cited as the norm for
the Supreme Court across the board over several decades. See Lazarus, supra note 29, at
1523.

400

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

decisions that were appealed from state courts.305 Finally, a brief word
about the Justices. Justice White wrote the most majority opinions in the
Clean Water Act cases (six), although an equal number of his opinions
could be characterized as favoring the position of environmental interests
as those opposing the position of environmental interests.306 Justice Stevens wrote the most dissents (seven) in the Clean Water Act cases by a
long shot, considering that no other Justice authored more than one dissent.307 Finally, Justice Stevens’s voting record was the most consistently
pro-environmental record of the Justices, as he voted in a manner that
could be characterized as favoring the position of environmental interests
in 86% of the cases.308
IX. CONCLUSION
Congress set ambitious goals in 1972 when it enacted the Clean Water
Act. For the first few decades after its enactment, Congress and the Supreme Court worked with the federal agencies administering the law to
interpret and implement it in ways that advanced those goals. Unfortunately, though, over time all three branches of government have been less
diligent in ensuring that the law’s water quality purposes are being advanced. The Court shifted its statutory interpretation focus to textualism
and, to the extent that it examines the purposes of the law, the Court now
focuses more frequently on the policy of the law regarding the protection
of state rights than the protection of the biological, physical, and chemical
integrity of the nation’s waters. In addition, as the Court shifted to textualism, its opinions became more clearly divided along ideological lines.
Further, as the Court has issued fewer and fewer decisions that can be
viewed as pro-environment in the Clean Water Act context, the Court has
increasingly adopted antiregulatory rhetoric in its opinions. The shift in
the Court’s analysis of Clean Water Act cases has coincided with Congress’s disengagement in overseeing the law and a shift in the approach
taken by federal agencies in interpreting the Act toward a focus on
§ 101(b) as opposed to the water quality protection goals of § 101(a).
Although this convergence among the three branches may seem bleak,
the Court’s decision in the County of Maui case was a positive break from
305. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. Since two of the three federal appellate
court decisions that were affirmed by the Court were affirmed in part and reversed in part,
only one federal appellate decision was fully affirmed by the Court. Id. That case, Train v.
City of New York, was the first case decided by the Court and was a companion case to
Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc., where the Court reversed the appellate court’s decision. Id. In contrast to the review of federal appellate court decisions, the Court upheld the
Washington Supreme Court’s decision in PUD No. 1. and Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s
decision in S.D. Warren Co. Id.
306. See CWA Spreadsheet, supra note 135. Three of Justice White’s opinions could be
characterized as upholding the position supported by environmental interests, while the
other three would not be characterized in that manner. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. Justice Stevens voted for the position supported by environmental interests in
eighteen of the twenty-one cases in which he participated. Id.
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many of the trends that had been developing over time. Standing against
the prevailing trend toward textualism, the Court’s decision relied heavily
on the purposes of the law to interpret the statute, and for the first time
since 2006, the Court bolstered its interpretation with an examination of
legislative history. In addition, the opinion was the first of the past nine
Clean Water Act statutory interpretation opinions that could be considered as a pro-environment decision, the first in which a regulated entity
petitioner lost on appeal, and the first case since 1987 where an environmental group brought the initial challenge that led to the Supreme Court
case and the Court’s decision benefitted the environmental group. The
County of Maui decision may be an anomaly, but advocates for clean
water can hold out hope that it may signify the beginning of another shift
in the Court’s Clean Water Act jurisprudence.
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